Michigan Law Review
Volume 39

Issue 4

1941

BOUNDARIES BY AGREEMENT AND ACQUIESCENCE
Harold M. Street
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Litigation Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Harold M. Street, BOUNDARIES BY AGREEMENT AND ACQUIESCENCE, 39 MICH. L. REV. 614 (1941).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol39/iss4/7

This Response or Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an
authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 39

BOUNDARIES BY AGREEMENT AND AcQUIESCENCE - An accurate
summation of the present-day status of the doctrines of boundaries by
agreement and acquiescence is contained in the, following statement
made by an eminent text writer: "There are, in this country, a great
number of decisions bearing upon the effect of an agreement by adjoining owners as to the boundary line between their lands, or of their
recognition of a certain line as the boundary without any express agreement in relation thereto. These decisions are frequently most unsatisfactory in their discussion of the principles involved, and, purporting,
as they variously do, to be based on principles of agreement, 'acquiescence,' 'practical location,' estoppel, or the statute of limitations, it is
impossible to deduce from them· any generally accepted rules upon the
subject." 1
Since Michigan has been a prolific source of litigation involving
boundary disputes which have brought the different theories before the
court for frequent consideration, this discussion is based primarily upon
a study of the Michigan cases. It is believed that the holdings of other
jurisdictions are amply illustrated by the Michigan decisions without
extensive separate consideration. It is possible that boundaries by agreement and boundaries by acquiescence should be treated as two separate
principles of law, but no distinction is observed in the Michigan cases,
and in this comment they will be treated as one doctrine referred to as
boundaries by acquiescence. No attempt will be made to reconcile all the
Michigan cases on this subject, for it is doubted that they can be reconciled, but an effort will be made to find some rational basis for the doctrine which can be supported by a majority of the cases.
I.

The case of Smith v. Hamilton 2 laid down what is generally accepted as an accurate statement of the doctrine as follows: "when
there has been an honest difficulty in determining the lines between
two neighboring proprietors, and they have actually agreed by parol
upon a certain boundary as the true one, and have occupied accordingly with visible monuments or divisions, the agreement long acquiesced in shall not be disturbed, although the time has not been sufficient
to establish an adverse possession." 8 Five elements of the doctrine are
implicit in the above statement: first, a dispute; second, an agr~ement;
third, occupation; fourth, visible monuments; and fifth, acquiescence.
It is when one or more of these elements is absent that difficulty arises.
Each element will be discussed separately.
2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, 3d ed., § 653 at p. 678 (1939).
20 Mich. 433 (1870).
8 Ibid. at 438. See also Joyce v. Williams, 26 Mich. 332 (1873); Stewart v.
Carleton, 31 Mich. 270 (1875).
1
2
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The doctrine of boundary by acquiescence is often confused with
the doctrine of adverse possession, it being sometimes said that the two
rules are "diametrically opposed" or the "antithesis" of each other,'
and at other times said that the distinction between the two is "one of
theory and not of substance." 5 It is clear that the doctrine of boundary
by acquiescence differs from the doctrine of adverse possession in two
important respects. First, the occupancy need not be hostile, and second,
the period of time may be shorter than that required for adverse possession. 0 It is where the acquiescence has been for a period longer than
the period necessary for adverse possession that the confusion most
frequently arises. 7
,.
If there is any real distinction between what is called boundaries by
practical location and boundaries by acquiescence it is not observed in
the cases,8 though distinctions are often attempted.9 It is suggested by
the writer that the term boundary by practical location should be used
to refer to cases where an entire plot has been erroneously laid out, the
several parties have acquiesced in the various boundaries for a considerable period of time and changing one boundary would entail an alteration of the entire scheme.10 The expression seems more consonant with
such a meaning.
Equitable principles applicable to mistakes of fact often cut across
the doctrine of boundaries by acquiescence. If the parties undertake by a
parol agreement to fix the location of a boundary line under the belief
that they are fixing the true boundary line, when in fact it is not, it is
said that the agreement may be set aside by either party upon the discovery of the mistake unless some element of estoppel exists.11 In order
'Warner v. Noble, 286 Mich. 654 at 662, 282 N. W. 855 (1938).
5
Bunde v. Finley, 224 Mich. 634 at 639, 195 N. W. 425 (1923).
ii Smith v. Hamilton, 20 Mich. 433 (1870); Joyce v. Williams, 26 Mich. 332
(1873); Stewart v. Carleton, 31 Mich. 270 (1875); Pittsburgh & L. A. Iron Co.
v. Lake Superior Iron Co., 118 Mich. 109, 76 N. W. 395 (1898).
7 See Gregory v. Thorrez, 277 Mich. 197, 269 N. W. 142 (1936); Corbishley
v. Gribben, 234 Mich. 304, 208 N. W. 34 (1926); Robertson v. Boylan, 214 Mich.
27, 181 N. W. 989 (1921); Green v. Anglemire, 77 Mich. 168, 43 N. W. 772
(1889); Lamoreaux v. Creveling, 103 Mich. 501, 61 N. W. 783 (1894).
8
Joyce v. Williams, 26 Mich. 332 (1873); Maes v. Olmsted, 247 Mich. 180,
225 N. W. 583 (1929); Bunde v. Finley, 224 Mich. 634, 195 N. W. 425 (1923).
9
2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, 3d ed., §§ 654, 655 (1939).
1
Flynn v. Glenny, 51 Mich. 580, 17 N. W. 65 (1883); Wilmarth v. Woodcock, 66 Mich. 331, 33 N. W. 40 (1887).
11
8 AM. JuR. 800-801 (1937); Blank v. Ambs, 260 Mich. 589, 245 N. W.
525 (1932); Phelps v. Brevoort, 207 Mich. 429, 174 N. W. 281 (1919); Lake
Shore & M. S. Ry. v. Sterling, 189 Mich. 366, 155 N. W. 383 (1915); Chapman v.
Crooks, 41 Mich. 595, 2 N. W. 924 (1879); Cronin v. Gore, 38 Mich. 381 (1878).
Also see Olin v. Henderson, 120 Mich. 149, 79 N. W. 178 (1899); Bird v. Stark,
66 Mich. 654, 33 N. W. 754 (1887); and Arduino v. City of Detroit, 249 Mich.
382, 228 N. W. 694 (1930).
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that the doctrine apply, the agreement is supposed to be to regard the
line as the boundary irrespective of whether or not it is in fact the true
line.12 A strict application of the above rule would probably make a
case of boundary fixed by acquiescence very rare indeed, because it is
likely that practically all .those cases are a result of a mistake of fact.
However, as will be pointed out later, courts frequently imply a proper
agreement 18 or else ignore the mistake factor altogether.
2.

Many of the boundary by, acquiescence cases appear to rest on
estoppel,14 and it is sometimes suggested that estoppel is the true basis
of the doctrine.15 However, for a true estoppel to exist it would be
necessary that there be some detrimental reliance, and it is clear from
the cases that detrimental reliance is not necessary.16 The only factor
that would seem to make an estoppel essential is the problem of getting
around the statute of frauds.17 Where the agreement rests on parol, it
appears that title to land is being transferred without a written instrument, and this difficulty is quite generally obviated by the fiction that
the agreement does not involve a transfer of title to land, but is merely
an application of the language of the instruments under which the
owners claim.18
Some of the cases indicate that the doctrine is based on the statute
of limitations, much the same as the doctrine of adverse possession.19
Though acquiescence without an agreement for longer than the statu12 8 AM. JuR. 800-801 (1937); Olin v. Henderson, uo Mich. 149, 79 N. W.
178 {1899); Van Den Brooks v. Correon, 48 Mich. 283, IZ N. W. 206 {1882);
Bird v. Stark, 66 Mich. 654, 33 N. W. 754 (1887).
18 See Manistee Mfg. Co. v. Cogswell, 103 Mich. 602, 61 N. W. 884 {1895).
14 2 TIFFANY, REAL PaoPERTY, 3d ed.,§ 656 (1939); 8 AM. JuR. 805 (1937);
Jones v. Pashby, 67 Mich. 459, 35 N. W. 152 (1887); Joyce v. Williams, 26 Mich.
332 (1873); Stewart v. Carleton, 31 Mich. 270 (1875); Cronin v. Gore, 38 Mich.
381 (1878). (The headnotes of the last two cases speak of estoppel, but the cases
do not seem to turn on that point.)
15 8 AM. JuR. 805 (1937); Jones v. Pashby, 67 Mich. 459, 35 N. W. 152
(1887). See 7 MINN. L. REV. 569 (1923).
16 Smith v. Hamilton, 20 Mich. 433 (1870); Hanlon v. Ten Hove, 235 Mich.
227, 209 N. W. 169 (1926); Renwick v. Noggle, 247 Mich. 150, 225 N. W. 535
(1929); Burns v. Martin, 45 Mich. 22, 7 N. W. 219 {1880).
17 See Jones v. Pashby, 67 Mich. 459, 35 N. W. 152 {1887); and Olin v.
Henderson, 120 Mich. 149, 79 N. W. 178 {1899).
18 2 TIFFANY, REAL PaoPERTY, 3d ed., § 653 at p. 679 (1939); 8 AM. }UR.
801 (1937).
19 Hanlon v. Ten Hove, 235 Mich. 227, 209 N. W. 169, 46 A. L. R. 788 at
792 (1926); Starr v. Suckert, 235 Mich. 234, 209 N. W. 171 (1926); Gildea v.
Warren, 173 Mich. 28, 138 N. W. 232 (1912); Renwick v. Noggle, 247 Mich. 150,
225 N. W. 535 (1929); Gregory v. Thorrez, 277 Mich. 197, 269 N. W. 142
(1936).
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tory period for adverse possession may create a boundary by acquiescence even though the claim is not hostile,2° it is clear that acquiescence
preceded by a proper agreement creates a boundary by acquiescence in
a period much shorter than that required for adverse possession.21 Thus
it appears that though under some circumstances the doctrine may rest
in part upon the statute of limitations, it does not necessarily do so.
Probably the only basis upon which most of the cases can be justified is one of policy. If the parties wish to settle a boundary dispute
without the expense of litigation it seems desirable that they be permitted to do so. Much the same principles as apply to arbitration agreements should be applicable in such cases. Also, if a boundary has long
been regarded as the true one, it seems undesirable that it should be
disturbed. It is believed that the policies of encouraging amicable agreements and discouraging the disturbing of supposedly good titles should
be t~e controlling factors in applying the doctrine of boundaries by
acquiescence.

3.
The existence of a bona fide dispute as to the true boundary is often
regarded as an essential element of the doctrine. 22 If this requirement
means that the agreement must be by way of compromise, the agreement should be binding immediately without a period of acquiescence. 23
The requirement is often stated in the alternative as a dispute or uncertainty concerning the location of the line.24 If the line is not in
dispute or uncertain, a parol agreement changing its location is said to
contravene the statute of frauds. 25 Clearly this is true, but the situation
seldom arises in practice. If no dispute exists, but there is uncertainty
as to the true location of the boundary, two situations may arise. First,
the parties may agree upon a line under the erroneous belief that it is
the true line when in fact it is not. Second, the parties may agree upon
a line to be regarded as the boundary regardless of whether or not it
is in fact the true line. The latter situation is practically the same as a
compromise agreement and should be treated accordingly. There is
no substantial difference between an agreement which avoids a dispute
20

See note l 9, supra.
See note 3, supra. Also 6 IND. L. J. 516 (1931).
22 Wilhelm v. Herron, 2u Mich. 339, 178 N. W. 769 (1920); Lake Shore &
M. S. Ry. v. Sterling, 189 Mich. 366, 155 N. W. 383 (1915); Turner v. Angus,
145 Mich. 679, 108 N. W. II00 (1906); Olin v. Henderson, 120 Mich. 149, 79
N. W. 178 (1899); Parsons v. Bills, 163 Mich. 415, 128 N. W. 721 (1910). Also
see De Long v. Baldwin, I I I Mich. 466, 69 N. W. 831 (1897).
23
8 AM. JuR. 799 (1937); Lecomte v. Toudouze, 82 Tex. 208, 17 S. W.
1047 (1891); 69 A. L. R. 1430 (1930).
24
8 AM. JuR. 799 (1937); Hanlon v. Ten Hove, 235 Mich. 227, 209 N. W.
169 (1926); 23 MxcH. L. REv. 547 (1925).
25
8 AM. }UR. 801 (1937); Turner v. Angus, 145 Mich. 679, 108 N. W.
II00 (1906).
21
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and an agreement which settles an existing dispute. But difficulty arises
where the first situation is found to exist, since an agreement based on a
mistake of fact is not generally regarded as binding.26 If the agreement
is to become binding, it must be a result of acquiescence. The policy
preventing the unsettling of titles should prevail to maintain the agreed
line if the acquiescence is for a sufficient period of time. 27

4.
As indicated above, the nature of the agreement may be a decisive
factor. Some courts require that the agreement be by way of co~promise. 28 Such an agreemerit should logically establish a boundary irrespective of acquiescence. 29 The compromise of conflicting claims should
constitute sufficient consideration to support the agreement. Possession
according to the agreed line should not be necessary, but is often required, presumably upon the idea that part performance is necessary
to take the case out of the statute of frauds. 30 Any agreement to regard
a certain line as the boundary where the true line is uncertain should be
binding though the parties presented no conflicting claims. 81 The settling of an uncertainty gives the agreement a status approaching compromise, and the giving up of potential claims should constitute consideration.
It is when the parties agree upon a line under the erroneous belief
that they are fixing the true boundary that most difficulty arises. Actually, there is no agreement in a true sense in such cases; the parties are
merely stating or acting upon an erroneous belief. Where the occupation and acquiescence is a result of mistake, logically either party can
upset the boundary at any time irrespective of the period of acquiescence. 82 The mistake would .prevent an estoppel from ari.sing, and
since the possession is not hostile, adverse possesion cannot be claimed
according to many courts.33 However, as a practical matter, courts genSee note 11, supra.
Hanlon v. Ten Hove, 235 Mich. 227, 209 N. W. 169 (1926); Renwick v.
Noggle, 247 Mich. 150, 225 N. W. 535 (1929); Bunde v. Finley, 224 Mich. 634,
195 N. W. 425 (1923); Argus v. Johns, 243 Mich. 595, 220 N. W. 663 (1928).
28 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, 3d ed., § 653 at pp. 679-680 (1939); Blank
v. Ambs, 260 Mich. 589, 245 N. W. 525 (1932).
29 Ibid. See Lecomte v. Toudouze, 82 Tex. 208, 17 S. W. 1047 (1891); also
8 TEX. L. REv. 610 (1930); 4 lowA L. BuL. 51 (1918).
30 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, 3d ed., § 653 at p. 680 (1939). But see Sussex
v. Farrand, 261 Mich. 76, 245 N. W. 575 (1932).
31 23 MicH. L. REV. 547 (1925).
82 8 Am. Jur. 800 (1937); Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. v. Sterling, 189 Mich. 366,
155 N. W. 383 (1915); Wilhelm v. Herron, 2n Mich. 339, 178 N. W. 769
(1920); Olin v. Henderson, 120 Mich. 149, 79 N. W. 178 (1899).
83 Warner v. Noble, 286 Mich. 654, 282 N. W. 855 (1938); Chapman v.
Crooks, 41 Mich. 595, 2 N. W. 924 (1879).
26
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erally refuse to disturb the boundary if there has been a long period
of acquiescence. Sometimes this result is reached by presuming a dispute and agreement,84 and other times seemingly as a matter of policy. 85
Where the acquiescence has been for a period sufficient to establish title
by adverse possession, the boundary is generally upheld, sometimes by
a conclusive presumption of a dispute and agreement,88 and sometimes
by confusing the doctrine with the doctrine of adverse possession 37
or by vaguely basing the decision on policy.88 The cases of Hanlon v.
Ten Hove 88 and Renwick v. Noggle" 0 seem to hold that where a line
has been acquiesced in for the statutory period for adverse possession,
it is the true boundary as a matter of law regardless of whether or not
a dispute or agreement ever existed. However, these decisions have
sometimes been completely ignored in later Michigan cases. 41
As a matter of policy, a boundary which has been acquiesced in for
the period required for adverse possession should not be disturbed. The
policy argument seems just as strong here as in the adverse possesion
cases. Where the parties have regarded the line as the boundary, their
acquiescence should be a strong basis for the inference that their conduct
was pursuant to an agreement and the boundary should not be disturbed without strong evidence to the contrary.

5.
Except in cases where an agreement is binding upon execution,'2
acquiescence is an essential element of the doctrine. It is clear that
HDiehl v. Zanger, 39 Mich. 601 (1878); Dupont v. Starring, 42 Mich. 492,
4 N. W. 190 (1880); Pittsburgh and L. A. Iron Co. v. Lake Superior Iron Co., II8
Mich. 109, 76 N. W. 395 (1898); Manistee Mfg. Co. v. Cogswell, 103 Mich. 602,
61 N. W. 884 (1895); Husted v. Willoughby, II7 Mich. 56, 75 N. W. 279 (1898).
811 Argos v. Johns, 243 Mich. 595, 220 N. W. 663 (1928); Jeffries v. Sheehan,
242 Mich. 167, 218 N. W. 703 (1928); Bunde v. Finley, 224 Mich. 634, 195
N. W. 425 (1923); Bunce v. Bidwell, 43 Mich. 542, 5 N. W. 1023 {1880); Flynn
v. Glenny, 51 Mich. 580, 17 N. W. 65 (1883); Wilmarth v. Woodcock, 66 Mich.
331, 33 N. W. 40 (1887); Renwick v. Noggle, 247 Mich. 150, 225 N. W. 535
(1929); Hanlon v. Ten Hove, 235 Mich. 227, 209 N. W. 169 (1926); 14 CAL.
L. REV. 138 (1926).
88 Husted v. Willoughby, II7 Mich. 56, 75 N. W. 279 (1898). See note 34,
supra. See 14 CAL. L. REv. 138 (1926).
81 Corbishley v. Gribben, 234 Mich. 304, 208 N. W. 34 (1926). Cf. Robertson
v. Boylan, 214 Mich. 27, 181 N. W. 989 (1921); Green v. Anglemire, 77 Mich. 168,
43 N. W. 772 (1889); Lamoreaux v. Creveling, 103 Mich. 501, 61 N. W. 783
(1894); 4 IowA L. BuL. 51 (1918).
88 See note 35, supra.
88 235 Mich. 227, 209 N. W. 169 (1926).
40 247 Mich. 150, 225 N. W. 535 (1929).
41 Warner v. Noble, 286 Mich. 654, 282 N. W. 855 (1938). Cf. Gregory v.
Thorrez, 277 Mich. 197, 269 N. W. 142 (1936). Also, Phelps v. Breevoort, 207
Mich. 429, 174 N. W. 281 (1919).
42 See note 29, supra.
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where there has been a dispute and agreement, if acquiescence is necessary at all,43 the acquiescence need not be for as long a period as required for adverse possession.44 For just how long the acquiescence
must continue, the courts are not clear. It is stated that the acquiescence
must be for "a considerable time" or equivalent language is used and
no definite rule laid down. 45 The shortest period upheld by the Michigan courts in a case squarely in point is eight years,4 6 but a shorter
period could well be considered sufficient.
Just what part the acquiescence plays in fixing the boundary is not
clear. It is variously suggested that the acquiescence coupled with occupancy takes the agreement out of the statute of frauds (presumably by
part performance),47 that it acts as an estoppel,48 that it raises a presumption of a binding agreement,49 and that it raises a presumption of
the correctness of the boundary. 50
In Michigan and several other states, a period of acquiescence of
predecessors in title may be tacked. 51

6.
There are no square decisions by the Michigan court in respect to
the necessity of occupancy according to the agreed line. If the agreement is binding upon execution, occupancy should not be essential. 52
If acquiescence is necessary, actual occupany would seem to be important only as evidence of acquiescence. 53
43 Some period of acquiescence seems to be required by the Michigan courts, regardless of the nature of the agreement, if parol. See note 41, supra.
44 See note 3, supra. Also Jones v. Pashby, 67 Mich. 459, 35 N. W. 152 (1887);
Cronin v. Gore, 38 Mich. 381 (1878); Argus v. Johns, 243 Mich. 595, 220 N. W.
663 (1928).
45 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, § 654 at pp. 684-685 (1939).
46 Jones v. Pashby, 67 Mich. 459, 35 N. W. 152 (1887).
41 See note 30, supra.
48 Jones v. Pashby, 67 Mich. 459, 35 N. W. 152 (1887); Joyce v. Williams,
26 Mich. 332 (1873). Also see Stewart v. Carleton, 31 Mich. 270 (1875); Bunce
v. Bidwell, 43 Mich. 542, 5 N. W. 1023 (1880); Flynn v. Glenny, 51 Mich. 580,
17 N. W. 65 (1883).
49 See notes 34 and 36, supra.
50 Parsons v. Bills, 163 Mich. 415, 128 N. W. 721 (1910); Bunde v. Finley,
224 Mich. 634, 195 N. W. 425 (1923); Argus v. Johns, 243 Mich. 595, 220 N. W.
663 (1928).
.
51 35 MicH. L. REV. n64 (1937).
52 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, § 653 (1939). See Lecomte v. Toudouze, 82
Tex. 208, 17 S. W. 1047 (1891); and Tietjen v. Dobson, 170 Ga. 123, 152 S. E.
222, 69 A. L. R. 1408 at 1430 (1929). Also see Sussex v. Farrand, 261 Mich. 76,
245 N. W. 575 (1932).
53 Cases cited in note 5 2, supra.
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7.
In most of the cases visible monuments marking the boundary
actually exist. To what extent visible monuments are necessary is not
clear,114 but it is difficult to justify such a requirement except upon evidentiary grounds. Many of the cases attach a presumption of correctness
to visible monuments as marking the true boundary,6 5 and where the
acquiescence has been for a considerable time, the presumption seems
almost conclusive. 56 These cases indicate that the requirement of visible
monuments is one of evidence only, but it is probably desirable to
adhere to the requirement in order to discourage fictitious claims.

8.
It is believed that the following rules are sound in principle and
can be supported by the decisions.
,
r. If an agreement as to a boundary line is by way of compromise
of conflicting claims, it should be binding upon execution. This conclusion finds little support in the Michigan cases, but is believed sound
in principle. Such agreements should create an agreed boundary and
should probably be treated as a separate rule of law.
2. Any agreement to regard a line as the true boundary, even
though based on a mistake of fact, should become binding when acquiesced in for a substantial period of time, though the period is short of
the statutory period for adverse possession.
3. As a matter of policy, where a line has been treated as the true
boundary for more than the statutory period for adverse possession, the
line should not be disturbed.
Harold M. Street

See De Long v. Baldwin, I I I Mich. 466, 69 N. W. 8 3 I ( I 897).
Bunde v. Finley, 224 Mich. 634, 195 N. W. 425 (1923); Diehl v. Zanger,
39 Mich. 601 (1878); Parsons v. Bills, 163 Mich. 415, 128 N. W. 721 (1910).
See 8 AM. JuR. 802 § 80 (1937).
56 Jeffries v. Sheehan, 242 Mich. 167, 218 N. W. 703 (1928); Flynn v. Glenny,
51 Mich. 580, 17 N. W. 65 (1883); Argus v. Johns, 243 Mich. 595, 220 N. W.
663 (1928).
H
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